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Camp bastion attack
Camp bastion attack










camp bastion attack

In layman's terms, on a base that hosts a number of units and different countries, the men responsible failed to figure out who does what in the event of an attack. The documents continue, citing the failure of both to ensure an integrated defense of the base. Finally, although MajGen Sturdevant appropriately focused his forces on generating aircraft sorties to support ground operations, he failed to simultaneously address the inherent responsibility of commanders at every echelon to provide security and protection for their forces. He also failed to provide adequate command direction and oversight to ensure his subordinates took appropriate actions to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities on the Camp Bastion airfield. This misjudgment unnecessarily exposed his personnel and equipment to enemy attack on 14-15 September 2012. He assumed that other units responsible for the protection of the BLS Complex would also protect 3d MAW(FWD) personnel and equipment on the Camp Bastion airfield, without fully understanding the capabilities and limitations of those units. MajGen Sturdevant failed to effectively integrate 3rd MAW(FWD) into the force protection posture for Camp Bastion. Gregg Sturdevant, who commanded the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (emphasis added): Lastly, MajGen Gurganus failed to adequately provide command direction and oversight to ensure his subordinates took appropriate actions to effectively mitigate the identified vulnerabilities at the Camp Bastion airfield. Further, he failed to achieve the coalition unity of effort necessary to ensure comprehensive protection of the BLS Complex or, alternatively, to take unilateral action to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level. He underestimated the threat posed by the enemy’s capabilities, overestimated US and coalition capabilities to counter that threat, and failed to take prudent steps to counter or mitigate an enemy attack. MajGen Gurganus maintained overall command responsibility for RC(SW) and knew, or should have known, of the force protection risks at the BLS Complex. Charles Gurganus, the commanding general of Regional Command Southwest (emphasis added): The findings pull no punches against Maj. “It’s in our doctrine it’s in our Marine Corps Warfighting publication … So, regardless of where you are in a drawdown, you’re required to balance protection versus force projection.” James Amos said upon relieving the two officers. “Whether it be 17,000 or 7,400, the commander still has the inherent responsibility to provide force protection for his or her forces,” Gen. Bradley Atwell, eight wounded, and six $24 million AV-8B Harrier jets destroyed. None of their injuries are considered life-threatening.The attack on a major base in Afghanistan was devastating, resulting in the deaths of Lt. In addition to the two coalition service members that were killed, nine coalition personnel – eight military and one civilian contractor – were wounded in the attack. Six soft-skin aircraft hangars were damaged to some degree.Ĭoalition forces engaged the insurgents, killing 14 and wounding one who was taken into custody. Three coalition refueling stations were also destroyed. Six Coalition AV-8B Harrier jets were destroyed and two were significantly damaged. Army uniforms and armed with automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers and suicide vests, the insurgents attacked coalition fixed and rotary wing aircraft parked on the flight line, aircraft hangars and other buildings. The insurgents appeared to be well equipped, trained and rehearsed.ĭressed in U.S. It has been more than a week since the insurgents attack Camp Bastion. The insurgents, organized into three teams, penetrated at one point of the perimeter fence. CAMP BASTION, Afghanistan Sergeant Rasheem Thomas never thought his first night working on Camp Bastion would turn into a gun battle with 15 insurgents.When Thomas was told he was transferring from 1st Platoon to 2nd Platoon, the landing support. when approximately 15 insurgents executed a well-coordinated attack against the airfield on Camp Bastion. 14 attack at Camp Bastion, in which two coalition service members were killed when insurgents attacked the base’s airfield, the International Security Assistance Force provides the following additional details.īecause it is still early in the investigation of this attack, this information is subject to change as new details become available.












Camp bastion attack